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Summary
The armed conflict between Argentina and Britain over the Falkland
Islands (Islas Malvinas) early in 1982, resulted in a confusing partition of the
maritime area around these islands. The military strategies and policies
developed by both countries during and after the war created an unclear
situation regarding limits and jurisdictions, thus delaying managerial actions
and regulation enforcement over the fishing resources of the area. Several
foreign fishing fleets operating in the region at the time, took advantage of the
lack of protective legislation and recognized authority, resulting in overfishing of
species such as squid and hake. No significant control was implemented until
1986, when Argentina signed fishing treaties with the former USSR and
Bulgaria in an effort to regulate fishing activities in Argentina's claimed
jurisdictional waters. This move was immediately followed by the British
announcement that fishing licenses would be issued to interested foreign
fishing vessels. The emerging management efforts, their political and economic
significance, and their consequences for the fisheries on the Patagonian shelf
are examined in this study.
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Introduction
After World War II, the commercial fishing of the world's oceans
entered a stage of rapid development. The total world harvest of some 20
million tons in 1950 increased by five times -to a total of 100 million tons- in
1990. 1 This intense level of activity determined that, in several cases, the
initially abundant captures would soon be replaced by unequivocal
symptoms of overfishing. The shortage resulting from the stocks' biological
constraints to cope with intense extraction became more severe as the
increasing adoption of zones of economic authority by coastal states
reduced the proportion of resources available for foreign harvest.2 In a few
years, the awareness of a limited scope of expansion in some of the world's
traditional fishing grounds prompted the need to search for additional
resources in new commercial regions. 3 Late in the 1970's one such region
was identified in the Southwest Atlantic. Several deep-water fleets then
turned their attention in that direction to harvest the virtually unexploited fish
resources located on the shelf expanding from the Argentine coast to the
Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).4
1Loayza, E.A. and L.M. Sprague. 1992. A strategy for fisheries development. World Bank
Discussion Papers. Fisheries Series. 135: 88p.
2Juda, L.1991. World marine fish catch in the age of exclusive economic zones and exclusive
fishery zones. Ocean Development and International Law, 22: 1-32.
3The FAO compiles fish catch statistics into fifteen major fishing areas. For a description of
each area see Gulland, J.A. 1971. The Fish Resources of the Ocean. Fishing News
(Books), Surrey, England: 255p. An estimate of the state of exploitation of each area is
presented by Loayza and Sprague, supra footnote 1. For a specific treatment of the
exploitation on selected stocks of the North Sea, the east and west coasts of North
America, and other areas, see, for example, Cushing, D.H. 1975. Marine Ecology and
Fisheries. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England: 278p.
4Reference to the Falkland Islands (Fig. 1), called Islas Malvinas by the Spanish community,
(or Falklands or the Islands, hereinafter) implies the main land masses (East and West
Falkland) and does not include Dependencies such as South Georgia, South Sandwich,
Shag Rocks and Clerke Rocks.
2
The aftermath of the 1982 hostilities between Argentina and Britain
over the Falklands perhaps represented the single most critical event during
the fishing history of this region.5 The magnitude of this relatively short
armed episode has had significant long lasting consequences for the
fisheries of the area since its effects still ensue.
This study reviews the legal, economic, and administrative issues
existing in the fisheries off Patagonia and the Falklands prior to and
following the military confrontation.6 It also delineates the different levels of
complexity arising from the global, regional, national, and zonal components
of this issue with the final goal of suggesting needed elements for a system
of rational management of these fishing grounds.
Definition of the Patagonian offshore area
The contact between Argentina and the Atlantic Ocean stretches for
some 4,989 km of shoreline.? Underwater, the land mass extends as a
gently sloped platform, which represents the largest continental shelf of the
Southern hemisphere. On this shelf, the Falklana Islands rise about 300
nautical miles east of the entrance to the Strait of Magellan, between 50° 53'
and 52° 58' South and 53° 37' and 61 ° 27' West (Fig. 1). This archipelago is
composed of about 200 islands which comprise a land area of
50n the hostilities themselves see, for example, Hastings. M. and S. Jenkins. 1983. The
battle for the Falklands. W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 384p.; Middlebrook, M. 1985.
Operation Corporate: the Falklands War, 1982. Viking, 430p.; Freedman, L. and V. Gamba-
Stonehouse. 1991. Signals of War. The Falklands Conflict of 1982. Princeton University
Press, New Jersey, 476p.
6For the purpose of this study, the term Patagonia refers to the territory between the Andes
and the Atlantic Ocean south of the Colorado River. Although most of the region belongs to
Argentina, a small portion of the extreme south lies within Chile.
7acean Yearbook 3, (E.M. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds.) The University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, pp. 563-568, Appendix G.
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approximately 4,700 square miles. The areal scope of a 200-nautical-mile
zone around the Islands reaches 149,000 square miles, whereas the
submarine area surrounded by the 200 meter isobath approximates 64,200
square miles. Correspondingly, a 200 nautical mile limit off Argentina closes
an area of 339,500 square miles as the 200 meter isobath circumscribes
232,200 square miles of the continental shelf (Fig. 2(a)).8
The historic record is unclear as to who discovered the Falklands.9
Most of the evidence, however, seems to indicate that the discovery
occurred in the 16th century by either the Spanish or the British. In 1690, the
British made the first recorded landing on the Islands. Sovereignty over the
Islands was contested by Britain and Spain from the 1760's to 1811, and by
Britain and Argentina ever since. At present, the Islands are administered as
a British crown colony by an appointed governor who heads a population of
about 2,000 people. Falkland Islanders call themselves kelpers and are
almost entirely descendants of early British settlers, largely Scottish. The
kelpers, in exercising the right of self-determination, have repeatedly
expressed both their wish to remain British citizens and their resistance to
any association with Argentina.
The whole area of the Islands is devoted to sheep farming. 10
Several tons of wool are produced annually which are sold to Britain as the
Islands' almost single resource. While these exports are valued at about
US$ 5 million making the colony almost self-supporting, occasional help
81nternational Boundary Study. 1972. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Theoretical Areal
Allocation of Seabed to Coastal States Based on Certain U.N. Seabeds Committee
Proposals, Limits in the Seas, Series A, No. 46: 35p.
9See, for example,Gravelle, J.F. 1985. The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: An international law
analysis of the dispute between Argentina and Great Britain. Military Law Review, 107: 5-69.
10Strange, I.J. 1972. The Falkland Islands. David & Charles, Newton, Abbot, 256p.
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'from Britain has been received. 11 It is obvious that the choice to continue
occupation of the Islands cannot be explained simply by reference to the
economic value of their land resources. Instead, the desire to maintain the
colonial situation has to be explained by a combination of other factors
beginning with the Islands' potential strategic and economic importance.
The geographic advantages of the Falklands are manifest when considering
the struggle for Antarctica12 and the interoceanic route and military-strategic
importance of the South Atlantic. The economic significance revolves
around two main resources: mineral deposits and fisheries.
The wide basin stretching between Patagonia and the Falklands has
long been considered an area of important hydrocarbons potential, with
reserves possibly as large as the North Sea. Evaluations of oil potential of
this continental· shelf have varied between 40 and 200 billion tons of
recoverable oil. Although the waters surrounding the Islands contain
sedimentary rocks with reasonable oil prospects, it is now considered that
claims of huge hydrocarbon reserves were too overtly optimistic.13
The fishery issue is further developed in other sections of this study.
At this point, it is worth noting that commercial fishing had never been
developed in the Falklands prior to the 1970 decade.
11 Maechling, Jr., C. 1991. Confidence bUilding and the future. In: Toward Resolution? The
Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (W.S. Smith, ed.), Lynne Rienner Publishers (London), pp.
109-119.
12See, for example, Morris, M.A. 1986. EEZ policy in South America's Southern cone. In:
Ocean Yearbook 6, (E.M. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds.) The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 563-568; Morris, M.A. 1988. South America Antarctic policies. In:
Ocean Yearbook 7, (E.M. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds.) The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 356-371.
131nternational Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1977. Vol. 10: 118-120; Doubts over oil potential of
the Falkland Islands, Petroleum Economist, 49 (5): 167 and 179 [1982]; McEwen, A.
1990. Falkland Islands hope for a boom in minerals. The Times, 1 February, 1990: 7.
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The Argentina/Britain contlict: Initial stages
The Falklands dispute received relative indifference from the
international community before 1982.14 A historical review of the arguments
and claims to territory over the Islands presented by Argentina and Britain
falls beyond the scope of this paper and is detailed elsewhere. 15 Multiple
resolutions and diplomatic negotiations were unable to settle the territorial
dispute that these two countries had had for more than a century. That
stagnant situation was dramatically altered on 2 April, 1982, when Argentina
deployed a military force to take control over the Islands. The following day,
both countries broke off diplomatic relations with each other, as the UN
Security Council passed Resolution 502 calling on both governments to use
diplomatic channels to settle their dispute.16 Despite attempts by the United
Nations and the United States to negotiate a settlement, British diplomats
preconditioned negotiations with a demand that Argentine troops pullout,
whereas their Argentine counterparts demanded the British recognition of
Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands. 17 Obviously, peaceful discussions
were hindered by the combination of two factors: first, a passionate
nationalism was being increasingly fueled and manipulated by the
14See, for example,Beck, P.J. 1985. The future of the Falkland Islands: a solution made in
Hong Kong? International Affairs, 61 (4): 643-660; Beck, P.J. 1988. The Falkland Islands
as an International Problem. Routledge, New York, 211 p.
15See, for example, Gravelle, J.F., supra footnote 8; Rubin, A. P. 1985. Historical and Legal
Background of the Falklands/Malvinas Dispute. In: The Falklands War: lessons for Strategy,
Diplomacy, and International Law (A.R Coli and A.C. Arend, eds.), Chapter 2, pp. 9-21,
Allen & Unwin, Massachusetts; Gamba, V. 1987. The Falklands/Malvinas War: model for
North-south Crisis Prevention. Allen & Unwin, Massachusetts, 212p.
16Barston, RP. and P.W. Birnie. 1983. The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas conflict. A
question of zones. Marine Policy, 7 (1): 14-24.
17Apple, Jr., RW. 1982. Britain imposing a war zone around Falkland Islands; Haig plans
mediation trips. The New York Times, 8 April, 1982: A1, A12.
6
Argentine military government so as to divert the public's attention from the
then existing catastrophic socioeconomic situation. Second, the sense of
humiliation of Great Britain, one of the world's top military powers, which was
facing the progressive decline of colonialist regimes. 18
Maritime zonation: A separating factor
The Argentine use of force on 2 April, 1982 caught the international
community by surprise. The reaction was fairly rapid by most states of the
European Community (EC) who showed their discontent with the military
invasion. 19 The British government, forced to implement hasty decisions,
quickly reacted by approving the departure of a strong naval task force
heading to the Islands. This immediate reaction also shocked the world's
nations and created concern even in British governmental and
parliamentary spheres.2o
On 7 April, 1982, Britain announced the establishment of a Maritime
Exclusion Zone (MEZ, Fig. 2(b)), a circular area with a 200-nautical mile
radius around the coordinates 51 °40' Sand 59°39' W.21 According to the
announcement, any Argentine vessel navigating those waters after 11 April
was liable to a British attack. Argentina's response to this threat was to
18Supra footnote 13.
19Edwards, G. 1984. Europe and the Falkland Islands crisis. Journal of Common Market
Studies,22 (4): 295-313.
20Supra footnote 8; Little, W. 1991. Political opinion in Britain. In: Toward Resolution? The
Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (W.S. Smith, ed.), Lynne Rienner Publishers (London), pp. 63-
80.
21 Supra footnote 15.
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declare a Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ, Fig. 2(b)), which covered the same
area as the MEZ, the very same day of the MEZ's announcement.22
The MEZ was relabeled as a Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ, Fig. 2(b))
on 28 April, 1982.23 This implied more stringent limitations and a serious
warning not only for Argentine planes or vessels but also to any other state
flying or navigating in the area in support of the Argentine forces. One day
later, the Argentine government announced that all British naval and air
forces within 200 miles from Argentina or the Falklands would be considered
hostile and referred to this area as the Exclusionary Zone (EZ, Fig. 2(C)).24
The threat of air raids over the British fleet led to a further extension of the
TEZ to prevent such attacks. On 8 May, 1982, the limits of the British
declared TEZ were pushed out to 12 nautical miles from the Argentine coast
(Fig. 2(c)). The nature of the extended TEZ was different from the original,
since in the former only Argentine battleships and military planes were
proscribed.25
On 23 July, 1982, forty days after the Argentine forces surrendered,
the TEZ was lifted by Britain with the understanding that Argentina's
warships and military aircrafts were not to enter a 150 nautical miles zone
around the Islands referred to as Falkland Islands Protection Zone (FIPZ,
Fig. 2(d)).26 As for territorial waters, Britain maintained a 3-nautical mile
22Schumacher, E. 1982. Argentina forms new zone in response to British move. The New
York Times, 8 April, 1982: A12.
23Supra, footnote 15.
24Diehl, J. 1982. Ships, planes called "hostile". The Washington Post, 30 April, 1982: A1,
A22.
25Supra footnote 15.
26Churchill, R.R. 1988. The Falklands fishing zone. Legal aspects. Marine Policy, 12 (4): 343-
360.
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band around the Islands, whereas Argentina claimed a controversial 200-
nautical mile territorial sea.27 This overwhelming succession of zones and
jurisdictions added to the general confusion triggered by the armed conflict
and favored an uncontrolled foreign fishing pressure on the local stocks.
Argentina's maritime claims and legislation
Argentina's maritime claims in terms of resource exploitation and
jurisdiction extent have been confusing and unclear since the 1940's. A
review of Argentina's maritime legislation will show that these norms have a
marked imprecision in their terminology, probably due to language
modalities or to different values associated with these issues. However, its
revealed behavior indicates that efforts have been made towards adjusting
its claims within a worldwide, or at least regional, international agreement.
Moreover, as it will be explained below, this pattern is observable not only in
Argentina's legislation but also in the demands of several other Latin
American states which, at times, proceeded as a consolidated unit and
introduced true innovations since the early development of an international
law of the sea.
After World War II, an increasing number of coastal states, notably
from the Latin American bloc, made extensive claims over their adjacent
maritime areas (see below). Different shades of these demands were
seminal at the origin of concepts such as the patrimonial sea and the
exclusive economic zone, which reflected, essentially, economic needs and
interests. Although the formulation of the different claims vary in their
terminology and reach, the underlying motives and philosophies behind
27Supra footnote 15.
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these declarations have similar scopes of objectives. This section
specifically reviews the evolution of pertinent legal instruments included in
Argentina's legislation in effect during the Falklands' crisis, and addresses
the connection between these claims and those formulated by other Latin
American states, in particular, and the world community, in general.
A. Towards an era of ocean control.
Throughout the sixteenth century, the debate between those states
favoring the freedom of the seas (mare Iiberum)28 and those advocating their
right to claim extensive areas (mare clausum)29 grew stronger. The
undisputed naval supremacy achieved by England during the eighteenth
century, relaxed the arguments in favor of a closed sea, and the doctrine of
mare clausum gradually faded from practice. Instead, the concept of a
narrower belt of waters along the coast, which could be defended by shore
based forces and over which a state had complete sovereignty, became
more appealing. However, the extension of these belts became an open
discussion (claims ranged from 3, 4, or 6 nautical miles, to even larger zones
or no claims at all) and no single distance was accepted as universal
international law.3o
The announcement of the two Truman Proclamations on 8
September, 1945 signi'ficantly altered the Grotian principle of freedom of the
seas and initiated new concepts in maritime jurisdiction by triggering the
28Grotius, H. 1608. Mare Liberum (English translation by R.v.O. Magoffin, 1916).
29Selden, J. Mare Clausum sive De Oominio Maris. In: Lapidoth, R. 1975, Freedom of
navigation- its legal history and its normative basis. Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce,
6: 259.
30See, for example, Von Glahn, G. 1986. Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public
International Law. MacMillan, New York, 763p.
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proliferation of national maritime claims beyond traditional territorial limits. In
the first proclamation, the United States asserted, among other things, its
jurisdiction and control over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed
of the continental shelf contiguous to the United States coast.31 In the
second proclamation, the United States "regards it as proper to establish
conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts
of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may
be developed and maintained on a substantial scale... "32 By doing so, the
United States not only called the world's attention to the notion of valuable
resources in the sea but also indicated the point of departure for the
implementation of unilateral conservation measures outside a state's
territorial waters without claiming rights to exclusive fishing.
B. The Latin American response.
The actions of the United States were immediately emulated and
exceeded by several Latin American states concerned about the modern US
fishing vessels operating off their coasts. Resenting this foreign presence in
their waters and the potential destructive nature of uncontrolled international
fish extraction, these states wished to extend their exclusive fishing
boundaries to eliminate outside competition. Only a month after the Truman
Proclamations, Mexico claimed similar rights in a presidential
31 Proclamation No. 2667, "Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf", September 28,1945.
American Journal of International Law, 40: 45 [1946].
32proclamation No. 2668, "Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal Fisheries in
Certain Areas of the High Seas", September 28, 1945. American Journal of International
Law, 40: 46 [1946].
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proclamation.33 A year later, Argentina not only claimed sovereignty over her
extraordinarily broad continental shelf but also over the water column above
the shelf.34 Within a few years, maritime claims multiplied and escalated.
Between 1946 and 1957, Panama35, Chile36 , Peru37, Costa Rica38,
Nicaragua39, and EI Salvador40 had each unilaterally claimed sovereignty
over their continental shelves and the superjacent waters and declared 200-
mile limits for exclusive fishing rights.
On 19 August 1952, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru proclaimed in the
Santiago Declaration41 their "...sole sovereignty and jurisdiction" seaward
for 200 nautical miles, while preserving "innocent and inoffensive passage"
in the zones. A brief interlude concerning the extension of maritime claims
33Presidential Declaration, 29 October, 1945. Laws and Regulations of the Regime of the
High Seas, 1: 13.
34 See below and footnote 59. Decree No. 14708 concerning National Sovereignty over
Epicontinental Sea and the Argentine Continental Shelf, 11 OCtober 1946, In: United
Nations, Laws and Regulations on the High Seas, pp. 4-5. Also Boletfn Oficial, December
5, 1946.
35Decree 449,17 December,1946. Gaceta Oficial, 24 December, 1946.
36Presidential Declaration, 23 June, 1947. Amador, F.V., 1972. Latin America and the Law of
the Sea. Law of the Sea Institute, Universffy of Rhode Island, OCCasional Paper No. 14: 52
pp. See, also, footnote 52.
37 Supreme Decree 781,1 August, 1947. Diario Oficial, 11 August, 1947.
38 Decree-Law 803,2 November, 1949. La Gaceta, 5 November, 1949.
39 Nicaragua Constitution of 1950, Art. 5.
40 EI Salvador Constitution of 1950, Art. 7.
41 First Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the
South Pacific. Declaration on the Maritime Zone. Santiago, Chile, August 11-19, 1952. In:
Amador, F.V., 1972. Latin America and the Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea Institute,
University of Rhode Island, Occasional Paper No. 14: 52 pp.
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was followed by additional Proclamations along these lines. Argentina42,
Nicaragua43 , and Panama44 in the 1960's, and Brazil45 in 1970, each
independently used domestic legislation to affirm 200-mile extensions of
their territorial waters.
New economic and political conditions after 1960 gave rise to
changes in the concepts of national sovereignty and economic rights, and
the increasing demand for a revision of the existing ocean regime.46 During
the 1970's, two significant concepts in the law of the seas emerged: the
patrimonial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
The notion of the patrimonial sea, first proposed in 1971 by a
delegate from Venezuela,47 would have granted coastal states sovereign
rights over all resources, as well as jurisdiction over scientific research and
marine pollution, in a belt extending seaward for 200 miles. The concept of
the patrimonial sea was formally endorsed and embodied in the Santo
Domingo Declaration of June 1972,48 which was proclaimed at the
Specialized Conference of the Caribbean States on the Problems of the
Sea. The declaration described the patrimonial sea in pertinent part:
42See below and footnote 61. Law 17094, 29 December, 1966. In: New directions in the
Law of the Sea. Documents- Volume I, 1973, (S. H. Lay, R. Churchill, and M. Nordquist,
eds.) OCeana Publications, N.Y.:13-14. Boletfn Oficial, 10 January, 1967.
43Decree No. II of 5 April, 1965.
44Act No. 31, 2 February, 1967.
45Decree Law No. 1098,25 March, 1970.
46Juda, L. 1979. UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order. Ocean
Development and International Law Journal, 7 (3-4): 221-255.
47Nelson, L.D.M. 1973. The patrimonial sea. International and Comparative Law Quarterly,
22: 668-686.
48Declaration of Santo Domingo, 7 June, 1972. American Journal of International Law, 66:
918.
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1. The coastal State has sovereign rights [emphasis added} over
the renewable and non-renewable natural resources, which are
found in the waters, in the seabed and in the subsoil of an area
adjacent to the territorial sea called the patrimonial sea.
2. The coastal State has the duty to promote and the right to regulate
the conduct of scientific research within the patrimonial sea, as well
as the right to adopt the necessary measures to prevent marine
pollution and to ensure its sovereignty over the resources of the
area.
3. The breadth of this zone should be the subject of an international
agreement, preferably of a worldwide scope. The whole of the area
of both the territorial sea and the patrimonial sea, taking into
account geographic circumstances, should not exceed a maximum
of 200 nautical miles.
4. The delimitation of this zone between two or more States should be
carried out in accordance with the peaceful procedures stipulated
in the charter of the United Nations.
5. In this zone ships and aircraft of all states, whether coastal or not,
should enjoy the right of freedom of navigation and overflight with
no restrictions other than those resulting from the exercise by the
coastal State of its rights within the area. Subject only to those
limitations, there will also be freedom for the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines.
This is the first 200-mile claim which is not a territorial sea in the strict
sense, since the right of "innocent passage", traditionally recognized in the
territorial sea, is expanded to free maritime and air navigation, a traditional
freedom of the high seas. It is clear in this definition of the patrimonial sea,
that claims are made over natural resources. In this way, the coastal state's
economic interests are protected, without any territorial c1aim.49
In January 1971, a delegate from Kenya first advanced the notion of
the EEZ at the Colombo session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative
49Aguilar, A.M. 1974. The patrimonial sea or economic zone concept. San Diego Law
Review, 2 (3): 579-602.
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Committee50. The Kenyan delegation then redrafted the concept in a
working paper for the Committee's Lagos session the next year. When
Kenya submitted its "Draft Articles on the Exclusive Economic Zone
Concept" to the Geneva session of the U.N. Sea-Bed Committee in late
1972, the EEZ officially became part of the law of the sea negotiations.51
Article 56 in Part V of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea enumerates coastal state rights, jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal
state in the EEZ:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal state has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and its
subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water, current and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this
Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this
convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall
act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and
subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI [The
continental Shelf].
50Nawaz, R. 1976. The emergence of exclusive economic zone: Implications for a new Law
of the Sea. Indian Journal of International Law, 16: 471.
51Joyner, C.C. 1981. The exclusive economic zone and Antarctica. Virginia Journal of
International Law, 21 (4): 691-725.
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Since the 1940's several Latin American states assumed a vigorous
position in defending their rights over their maritime space, although with
different modalities and denominations. The claim by Chile in 1947 has real
importance as an indicator of change from the traditional concept.52 In this
instance, Chile established an extension of 200 miles of '...national
sovereignty over the seas adjacent to its coasts... to preserve, protect,
conserve, and exploit the natural resources...". It was made clear that this
disposition did not affect free navigation of the sea.
In 1970, Latin American states gathered in Montevide053 and lima54,
adopting two declarations. Both of these declarations recognize the right of
coastal states over the natural resources of their adjacent seas, without
affecting the freedom of navigation and overflight for ships and planes of any
flag State. Although the right to establish limits to their "... maritime
sovereignty and jurisdictions [emphasis added]..." was claimed by states
subscribing to the Declaration of Montevideo, it was also declared that" ...
sovereignty or exclusive rights [emphasis added]. .. over maritime zones
adjacent to their coasts, over the seabeds and subsoiL." have been
extended to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline of the
territorial sea. In lima, the rights of coastal states to establish their limits of
"... sovereignty or jurisdiction over the sea... [emphasis added]" according to
reasonable criteria, were also recognized. The terms sovereignty and
52Supra footnote 36.
53Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, Montevideo, Uruguay, May 4-8, 1970. In:
Amador, F.V., 1972. Latin America and the Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea Institute,
University of Rhode Island, Occasional Paper No. 14: 52 pp.
54Declaration of Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, Lima, Peru, August 4-8,1970.
In: Amador, F.V., 1972. Latin America and the Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea Institute,
University of Rhode Island, Occasional Paper No. 14: 52 pp.
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jurisdiction, and sovereignty or jurisdiction illustrate the wide range of views
with which powers on a territorial sea or a patrimonial sea were debated.55
In general, the analysis of Latin American laws pertaining to the
establishment of their maritime areas, indicates that these states have
claimed rights of either sovereignty, exclusive rights, sovereign rights,
jurisdiction, national dominion, protection and control, property, or any other
form of authority.56
The EEZ concept soon replaced the notion of the patrimonial sea and,
within two years, it was recognized as a "common aim" by the so-called
Group of 77. In spite of U.S. opposition to extensive offshore coastal state
jurisdiction, there has been a growing acceptance of the EEZ as an essential
component of the emerging law of the sea since the early 1970's. The first
EEZ claim which did not receive challenges from the international
community -an indicator of the increasing acceptance of this concept as
becoming embodied in customary practice- was the one by Costa Rica in
1972.57
c. Argentina's maritime claims.
The 1853 Argentine Constitution as amended in 1957, has no
provisions on the extension and claims over maritime and submarine areas.
The first claim in this regard appeared in Decree 1386 of 24 January, 194458
55Garcia-Amador, F.V. 1974. The Latin American contribution to the development of the Law
of the Sea. The American Journal of International Law, 68: 33-50
56Szekely, A. 1986. A study of the contribution of the Latin American states to the
development of the International Law of the Sea since 1945. In: Latin America and the
Development of the Law of the Sea. Part 1. OCeana Publications, New York, 361 p. Also
see footnote 48.
57Supra footnote 2.
58Boletfn Oficial, March 17, 1944.
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which established that" ...the epicontinental sea of Argentina, shall be
deemed to be temporary zones of mineral reserves". On 11 October. 1946,
Article 1 of Decree 1470859 declared that ".. .the Argentine epicontinental sea
and continental shelf are subject to the sovereign power of the nation".
Article 2 of the same document affirmed that" For the purposes of free
navigation. the character of the waters situated in the Argentine
epicontinental sea and above Argentine continental shelf, remains
unaffected by the present Declaration".
Early in 1966, the massive Soviet fishing effort offshore Argentine
coasts raised concern on the future of fish resources. The Soviet catch for
that year totaled 73,000 mt, nearly one-third of Argentina's entire catch of
about 250,000 tons.60 Two events led to demands for actions to be taken by
Argentine officials: first, the realization that most of the Soviet catch was
hake. the primary species utilized by Argentine fishermen. Second,
incoming reports revealed Soviet plans to undertake a massive expansion
of the fishery in 1967. After the dimensions of the Soviet effort had become
apparent, Law 17094 of 29 December 196661 was passed. This declaration
redefined earlier Argentine claims but, at the same time, caused some
uncertainty reading as follows:
Article 1. "The sovereignty [emphasis added] of the Argentine nation
shall extend over the sea adjacent to its territory for a distance of
200 nautical miles measured from the line of the lowest tide..."
59Supra. footnote 34.
60Jacobson. D. and D. Weidner. 1989. Argentine-Soviet Fishery Relations Reviewed, 1966-
88. Marine Rsheries Review, 51 (2): 55-68. See, also, footnote 73.
61 Supra footnote 42.
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Article 2. "The sovereignty of the Argentine nation shall also extend
over the seabed and the subsoil of the submarine zones
adjacent to its territory up to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond
this limit, up to that depth of the overlying waters which allows
exploitation of the natural resources of those zones".
Article 3. "The provisions of this law shall not affect freedom of
navigation or of air traffic".
Article 4. "Within ninety days from the date of promulgation of this law,
the National Executive Power shall issue regulations
establishing the terms under which foreign ships may conduct
operations designed to explore and exploit the natural resources
of the sea within the 200-nautical-mile zone referred to in this
law".62
Decree 5106 of 29 December, 196663implies the claim of a territorial
sea beyond 12 nautical miles. Article 1 of this instrument indicates that "...the
Naval Operations Command shall be authorized to issue foreign fishing
vessels which request them permits to carry out fishing operations in the
Argentine territorial sea [emphasis added] at a distance of no less than
twelve miles from the coast." Shortly after, the first Argentine Fishing Law
(Law 17500 of 25 October, 1967)64 was issued. The Fishing Law
established that:
Article 1. The resources of the Argentine territorial sea [emphasis
added] are the property of the national State, which shall authorize
their exploitation in accordance with the provisions of this Act and
the rules governing its application.
62According to some writers Law 17094 was never intended to be of international application
(See, for example, Travieso, J.A. 1983. Hacia un horizonte de 200 millas. Notas sobre la
zona econ6mica exclusiva en los espacios maritimos. Revista del Colegio de Abogados
de Buenos Aires, 43: 56 p). It is also in open contradiction with the Argentine position
during the subsequent negotiations at UNCLOS III.
63Compilaci6n Legislaci6n Pesquera. 1981. Secretarfa de Estado de Intereses Marltimos,
Subsecretaria de Pesca (Buenos Aires), NO.2: 120p.
64Supra footnote 63. See, also, footnote 71.
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Article 2. Resources up to a distance of twelve nautical miles from the
coast may be exploited only by vessels flying the national flag. In
addition, the Executive Power shall each year select, within the
Argentine territorial sea, a specific zone whose exploitation shall be
reserved for vessels flying the national flag.
The enormous potential of the fish resources off Argentina quickly
attracted domestic and foreign interests. At the national level, Law 18502 -
passed on 24 December, 1969-65 limited the offshore jurisdiction of
Argentina's coastal provinces to 3 nautical miles from the low-water mark,
leaving the area between that limit and 200 nautical miles under the sole
jurisdiction of the federal government. This restriction on the exploitation
rights over the natural resources has been repeatedly contested by the
provincial governments which pushed for an extension of full jurisdictional
rights out to 12 miles and even to their adjacent 200-mile zone.66 Regarding
foreign fleets, Decree 8802 of 22 November, 196767 contained "Provisional
Regulations Governing the Issue to Foreign Vessels of Permits for the
Exploitation of the Living Resources of the Argentine Territorial Sea". In the
first article it is mandated that "[f]oreign vessels may engage in activities
involving the exploitation of the living resources of the Argentine territorial
sea beyond a distance of twelve nautical miles from the coast [emphasis
added] only if they have in their possession, before the commencement of
their activities, a local registration document (matricula) and a permit..."
65 Supra footnote 63.
66Brandani, A. 1987. The coastal zone of Argentina: environments and institutions. Coastal
Management, 15: 43-59.
67Supra footnote 63.
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D. Resume.
The Truman Proclamations of 1945 initiated a new era in the
development of a universal law of the sea. Shortly after, a number of states
expressed their demands regarding the exploration, exploitation, and
conservation 0'1 natural resources. However, most of these unilateral early
Latin American claims have been gradually modified or abandoned in favor
of a universally accepted claim to an EEZ extending to a limit of 200 nautical
miles from the territorial sea baselines.
It is interesting to note that at the time the Falklands issue ripened into
a crisis, leading to a concert of changing zones and delimitations, the Third
UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was approaching its
conclusion. In this forum, limits for territorial seas were being established
together with the definition of the EEZ to preserve the marine economic
resources of coastal states. It is important to point out that although the 1982
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - which Argentina signed in 1984-
has not entered into force yet, most of its provisions (except perhaps for
those regarding the deep-seabed) are presently accepted as international
customary law.58 Therefore, the applicability of these provisions are binding
and independent of the ratification of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the
Sea. Consequently, sovereignty over the territorial sea cannot be extended
beyond 12 nautical miles. In the EEZ, there is no sovereignty, but rather
sovereign rights of the coastal State over natural resources, without affecting
the other traditional freedoms of the high seas.
68See, for example, Miles, E.L. 1988. Preparations for UNCLOS IV? Ocean Development
and International Law, 19: 421-430.
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More recently, on 14 August, 1991, the Argentine Congress
sanctioned Law 23968, by which the baselines of Argentina are clearly
defined, together with the definition of internal waters, territorial sea (of 12
nautical miles), contiguous zone (out to 24 nautical miles), exclusive
economic zone (to a limit of 200 nautical miles), and continental shelf (either
to 200 nautical miles or to the border of the continental margin).69 For the
first time, all these zones have been detailed in a single instrument and are
in complete conformity with the terminology as interpreted in the framework
of UNCLOS III.
The Patagonian fishery
A. Fishing off Argentina.
Commercial fishing operations in Argentina started early in this
century. An artisanal fishery, composed of horse-hauled nets and small
vessels, supplied local markets with fresh seafood products and raw
materials for salted and canned products which constituted the most
important fishery items until the 1950's. Prior to the 1960 decade, the
Argentine fishing fleet remained limited to small coastal purse-seiners and
no more than 15 deep-water vessels. Since 1963, the offshore catch
exceeded the coastal production and frozen products became the industry's
major commodity.70
The expansion of the Argentine fishing industry during the 1960's
was a result of encouraging legislation and increasing national and foreign
69So/etin Oficia/, No. 27278, 5 December, 1991, Art. 1-11, Annexes I and II.
70Sertolotti, M.I., G.V. Piergentili, and D.A. Cabut. 1985. EI sector pesquero Argentino.
Rea/idad Econ6mica (Buenos Aires), (65): 70-96.
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investments. At the domestic level, Law 1750071 established tax exemptions
for fuel expenses during fishing operations and for imported fishing vessels.
Export figures clearly illustrate the boost in the activity following large
investments in the sector (i.e. marketing, fleet, gear, etc.). For example, the
total volume of exported fishery products rose from 8,700 tons in 1969 to
64,900 tons in 1974, which translates in an increase in revenues from US$
2.8 million to US$ 33.6 million.72
Foreign exploitation of fish stocks on the Argentine shelf became
dramatically evident by 1967. The Soviet distant-water fleet, composed of
motherships and factory trawlers, represented the most significant presence
in the area. In 1966 and 1967 alone, the intense Soviet fish extraction
totalled some 751,000 metric tons.73 Although most of the catch was hake
(MerJuccius hubbs/) the effects of overfishing were reflected in the collapse
of the hawkfish (CheiJodacfyJus bergl) stock. The threat posed to a number of
coastal demersal species prompted the Argentine government to issue
urgent fishing regulations. In less than a year, Laws 17094 and 17500, and
Decrees 5106 and 8802 (see above) were passed as a measure to protect
the fishery resources from uncontrolled foreign fishing and to generate
revenues from fishing licence fees.
From the 1970's onwards, the Argentine fishing industry showed a
considerable expansion. During the 1970-1979 decade, total landings
71 See footnotes 63 and 64.
72pereira Fernandez, F. 1985. Argentine fishery activity in light of the main events which
have recently affected it. In: Adjustments to changes in fisheries law and economics
(Cleveland, B.C., ed.) FAD Fish. Tech. Pap., (269): 115p.
730ther countries, namely Japan, West Germany, Cuba, and Spain had fishing vessels
operating in the area at that time, with comparatively lower capture volumes. Also see
footnote 60.
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reached over 3 million metric tons (an increase of 210% over the total catch
of the previous 10 years) of which one third was exported at a value of about
604 million dollars.74 Several factors contributed to this marked growth: 1) A
progressive exhaustion of traditional fishing grounds in other areas of the
globe; 2) The rapid increase of sovereignty claims by riparian states over
200-mile offshore zones, which limited access to foreign fleets; 3) Advanced
technologies incorporated by leading fishing nations to their distant-water
fleets in order to tap even more remote stocks; 4) A favorable international
commercial climate for the marketing of Argentine fish; and 5) Relatively low
prices for the purchase of new vessels and upgrading of the national fleet.75
The auspicious prospects envisioned under those circumstances, led the
Argentine government to promulgate Law 20136 of 5 February, 1973,76
which extended the claims of exclusive exploitation by Argentine vessels of
the fish resources from 12 nautical miles (Law 17500, see above) to 200
nautical miles from the coast, and established a sanction schedule for
violators.
B. Fishing off the Falklands.
The end of the armed hostilities between Argentina and Britain over
the Falklands indicated the beginning of a fishing management vacuum.
After JUly, 1982, neither Argentina nor Britain were regulating fishing
activities of foreign fleets in the South West Atlantic. On the one hand,
74The main importers of Argentine fishery products were the United States, Spain, Brazil,
and Japan. Supra footnote 72.
75Supra footnote 72.
76Supra footnote 63.
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Argentina, back in the reality of its complicated internal affairs, was trying to
heal the wounds of its broken honor. It was a time in which patrolling
jurisdictional waters and enforcing legal foreign fishing were certainly not
national priorities. On the other hand, Britain was too busy learning how to
manage its responsibilities on a territory located 8,000 miles away.??
Surveillance of waters adjacent to the Islands was oriented to preventing a
new potential attack by Argentina, and not on other foreign vessels fishing in
the area.
Several nations, aware of the economic benefits of fishing around
the Falklands, relocated their fleets in this area dominated by British
indifference and away from Argentine regulations and control. Notably,
Poland, the former USSR, Spain, Taiwan, Japan, and East Germany had the
capabilities to exploit that fishery estimated to yield, as of 1979, a potential
US$ 200 million/year.?8 Prior to 1982, three commercially important finfish
species were exploited from the offshore South West Atlantic: common hake
(Merluccius hubbsi), Patagonian hake (M. polylepis) , southern blue whiting
(Micromesistius australis), and Antarctic cod (Notothenia rossil). In the five
years from 1977 to 1981, the combined extraction of these species totalized
slightly over 2,000,000 metric tons.?9 Of these resources, common hake,
together with Patagonian hake,8o are the most important finfish stocks of the
Southwest Atlantic. Common hake represents the main target and exported
77 Supra footnote 9.
78Spafford, R.N. 1984. The Falkland Islands. World Fishing, 33 (10): 10-12.
79Csirke, J. 1987. The Patagonian fishery resources and the offshore fisheries in the South-
West. Atlantic. FAO Rsh. Tech. Pap., (286): 75 p.
BOThe differentiation of these two species is not immediate from a simple external inspection
and, thus, are usually pooled together in most commercial statistics.
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item of Argentina's fisheries. Until the 1970's, hake fishing was concentrated
in the River Plate basin and in the northern Patagonian shelf area. Uruguay
also developed a hake fishery off the River Plate Basin but of comparatively
smaller magnitude. Both countries have been jointly managing the shared
hake stock through the Joint Argentinian-Uruguayan Technical Commission
for the Maritime Front.81 In 1979, Argentina incorporated larger vessels into
its fleet which expanded the range of hake extraction to the Falklands sector,
from which 5 to 10 thousand tons of hake per year were captured until
1982.82
However, the dangerous events of 1982 forced the fishing fleets
operating in the area to limit their traditional ventures and seek for
alternative sources. Under these circumstances, the fishing efforts shifted to
two additional species: shortfin squid (llIex argentinus) and common squid
(Loligo spp.). Throughout most of the 1970 decade, squid catches in the
region were limited to a small scale fishery off the River Plate basin exploited
by Argentina and Uruguay. By 1978, the intensification of Argentine fishing
effort on the Patagonian shelf and slope, in addition to the initial harvests
around the Falklands by Polish, Japanese, and Soviet vessels, resulted in a
substantial increase in squid capture. During the period 1978-1981 the
combined total catch for these two species reached over 280,000 metric
tons.83
81The River Plate and Maritime Front Treaty between Argentina and Uruguay was signed on
19 November, 1973, and entered into force on 12 February, 1974. For full text, see
Continental Shelf Boundary: Argentina-Uruguay. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, Limits in the Seas, No. 64: 16p [1975).
82Supra footnote 79.
83Supra footnote 79.
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The lIIex fishery takes place north of the Islands with peak catches in
April and May. The main fishing countries are Poland, Japan, Taiwan, and
Korea, which operate mainly jiggers. Loligo squid are targeted by Polish,
Spanish, British, and other EC countries' trawlers operating during two
fishing seasons. The main catch takes place south of East Falkland from
February to June. From August to October, the fishing area is localized east-
northeast of the Islands. The life cycle of both species is very short since they
reach sexual maturity within a year and usually die after spawning. Their
pattern of aggregation is very variable throughout the year: while IIlex
undergoes extensive horizontal migrations, Loligo appears to migrate
mainly following the vertical axis. The implication of these biological traits
are fundamental for any managerial action. Given the short life span, it is
critical to determine the level of adult escapement that will breed the next
generation. To attain this level, the overall fishing pressure on the stocks
while moving through different fishing sectors needs to be known and
observed. The noxious combination of logistic difficulties to monitor and
enforce control on a migratory resource, and the uncertainties associated
with the estimation of a "safe" escapement target can result in a drastic
fishery collapse.
The large size of squid stocks, combined with a good selling price
and numerous Asiatic and European markets developed serious interests in
their exploitation. Projections on the squid potential catch around the
Falklands estimated more than 250,000 tons per year, valued at
approximately £ 100 million.84 This potential revenue interested British
fishing companies, which proposed that a "fishing policy be enforced to
84Supra footnote 78.
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establish a formal industry and to preserve the stocks from being abused.
Such action required the declaration of a 200-mile fishing zone around the
Islands, and a system of fishing licences to be applied to interested foreign
fleets. 85 However, the British government delayed a decision on this
proposal concerned about a relapse with Argentina.
Significant increases in squid catch volumes began to attract new
foreign interests and to alarm some British, Falkland, and Argentine sectors.
An average of 237,000 tons of squid per year was exploited between 1982
and 1985. The total fishing effort by trawlers of any origin operating in the
area increased from 9,919 hours in 1982 to 36,412 hours in 1985.86 Signs of
saturation of squid markets and unbalances with regard to some finfish
products were starting to become evident .87
Management. attempts on the Patagonian fishery
The increasing trend of the annual harvests called for immediate
actions to be taken. On November, 1985, the FAO Fisheries Department
decided to compile the available information on the South Western Atlantic
fisheries and to advise on their future regulation.88 The report, which was
finished one year later, had a limited circulation among the major involved
countries. A final version was finally published in 1987 89 indicating that the
85Supra footnote 78.
86Supra footnote 79.
87See, for example, Action needed on squid. World Fishing, 35 (3): 43 [1986]: EEC squid
import control. World Fishing, 35 (8): 33 [1986].
88The Falklands - Action at last? World Fishing, 35 (3): 3 [1986].
89Supra footnote 77.
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squid stocks were being maximally exploited and probably overfished. The
geographical proximity of the high seas, remote (i.e. unprotected) Argentine
waters, and the British imposed 150-mile zone around the Islands
(unregulated in terms of fishing operations), provided a convenient location
for intense fishing. In fact, movements of fishing vessels from one area to
each one of the others were difficult to monitor and restrict. Several
incidents, ranging from catch and gear seizure to fire-fighting encounters,
between foreign fishing vessels and Argentine Coast Guard patrollers were
registered since 1986.90 These events displayed the maintenance of
Argentine claims of sovereign rights and jurisdiction over resources within
200 nautical miles from its coast and the enforcement of national fishing
regulations. 91
An important step to achieve managerial control and attract
international recognition was taken on July 1986 after the signature of
fishing agreements between Argentina and both the former USSR and
Bulgaria.92 Under these treaties, Soviet and Bulgarian trawlers were granted
fishing access to Argentine waters (and use of land located bases), to
participate in joint ventures, and to extract surplus resources as determined
by Argentine authorities. Argentina, in turn, was to collect 3 to 5% of the
catch revenue, and to offer employment to its nationals either as inspectors
on board or crew members. However, these arrangements led to a strong
90See, for example, Hu, N.-TA 1987. The Sino-Argentine "Squid war" of 1986. Marine
Policy, 11 (2): 133-142; Prefectura Naval Argentina. Ambito Financiero (Buenos Aires),
Suplemento especial, 30 October, 1990: 1-4.
91 Supra footnote 60; Tiempo de negociaci6n en el Atlantico Sur. Redes de la Industria
Pesquera Nacional, (46): 6-13 [1989).
92See, for example, Falklands delay. World Rshing, 35 (8): 33 [1986); The Falklands - Action
at last. World Fishing, 35 (11): 3 [1986).
29
reaction, mainly among Argentine research and fishing sectors, who feared
an uncontrolled exploitation.93
The British reaction to Argentina's fishing negotiations was the
creation of a new zone. On 29 October, 1986, the British government
declared the Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management Zone
(FICZ, Fig. 2(e)).94 The breadth and seaward limits of the FICZ were identical
to those of the FIPZ, with the exception of a truncation of the circular limit in
its southwest sector,95 with the added components of a fishing zone.
Embodied in this announcement was the reserved right to eventually extend
the outer boundary of the FICZ from 150 to 200 nautical miles. Full details on
the rules to be observed within this fishing zone were provided on 12
November, 1986 through the Fisheries Ordinance issued by the Falkland
Islands Legislative Council.96 According to this legislation, fishing licenses
should be issued by the Falklands Director of Fisheries on an individual
basis (i.e. regardless of 'flag state).97
Despite repeated Argentine protests to the establishment of the FICZ
the new limitation became effective on 1 February, 1987.98 A total of 326
93 The Falklands - Action at last. supra footnote 92.
94See, for example, Churchill, R.R. 1988, supra footnote 26; Falkland Islands Interim
Conservation & Management Zone. Fisheries Report '87/88. Falkland Islands Government
(Stanley): 45p [1989].
95To avoid a jurisdictional overiap, Britain decided to enforce the median boundary line as the
operational limit where the distance between the Falklands and Argentina is less than 400
miles. See, for example, Common sense, World Fishing, 35 (12): 3 [1986].
96FICZ Fisheries Report '87/88, supra footnote 94.
97License fees for Falkland fisheries. World Fishing, 35 (12): 23 [1986].
,
98See, for example, Carta de fecha 30 de oetubre de 1986 al Secretario General por el
Representante Permanente de la Argentina ante las Naciones Unidas. United Nations,
General Assembly, A/411784, s/18438, 31 October, 1986.
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vessels were licensed during that first year, which represented a gross
income of US$ 24 million collected by the Falkland Island government.99
Surveillance control was intensified and violators arrested and/or fined. 100
It soon became obvious that the straddling movements of the stocks
being fished required special attention.101 Specifically, the life cycle of JIIex
sp. involves extensive movements between the FICZ, Argentine waters, and
the high seas. Falkland fishing officials claimed for an extension of the FICZ
to 200 nautical miles to ensure more effective conservation
measurements. 102 Once again, a potential recrudescence of the differences
with Argentina pressed Britain in a more moderate direction and the 150-
mile limit was maintained. Alternative approaches proposed to alleviate the
fishing pressure over squid stocks included the shortening of the fishing
season, a reduction in the fishing effort (i.e. limit the number of licenses), or
negotiations for self regulation while fishing in international waters.103
In 1988, 407 licenses were issued, resulting in a fee revenue of US$
31 million. The total catch from the FICZ (317,000 tons) was marketed at 234
million dollars.104 During 1989, only 302 licenses were distributed and a
99Churchill, A.A., supra footnote 26.
100Falkland arrests. World Fishing, 37 (6): 56 [1988].
101Gulland, JA 1987. Falklands fishing. Marine Policy, 11 (3): 240.
102Falkland Islands needs extended fishing zone. World Rshing, 37 (12): 38 [1988].
103Southwest Atlantic IIlex squid. Fishing effort cannot be sustained. Fishing News
International, 29 (6): 14-15 [1990]; FICZ Fisheries Report '87/88, supra footnote 94.
104Spain maintains strong presence in the Falklands. World Fishing. 38 (4): 26-28 [1989].
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reduction of two weeks in the duration of the fishing season was determined
to allow for a build up in squid spawning stocks. 105
Just when alarming figures were forecasting an imminent collapse in
the local squid stocks due to overtishing, relieving news regarding a
strengthening of the relationships between Argentina and Britain started to
circulate. Delegations from both countries sketched an agenda of common
interests on 18-19 August, 1989.106 Those topics were fully discussed at a
joint meeting held in Madrid on 17-19 October, 1989. Salient points of the
resulting statement indicated the avoidance of military aggression and the
common interest to restore trade and communication relations. A working
group on fisheries met in Paris on 18-19 Deoember, 1989. That body
determined that mutual exchange on information regarding stock status and
statistics and fishing fleet operations was necessary for bilateral cooperation
and conservation. 107
Resumption of consular relations between london and Buenos
Aires reinforced the potential for intense dialogue.108 British and Argentine
diplomats gathered together on 14-15 February, 1990, to discuss air and
maritime safety, operation of armed units, and other pertinent topics. An
emergent concession at this stage of relations was the complete elimination
105See, for example, Tiempa de negociacion en el Atlantico Sur, supra footnote 91;
Southwest Atlantic Illex squid. Fishing effort cannot be sustained, supra footnote 103.
106 Argentina-United Kingdom: Joint statement of relations and a formula on sovereignty
with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands.
International Legal Materials, 29 (5): 1291-1295 [1990].
107Argentina-United Kingdom: Joint statement on confidence-building measures, including
an infonnation and consultation system and safety measures for air and maritime
navigation. International Legal Materials, 29 (5): 1296-1304 [1990].
108Giles, T. 1989. Argentina and UK fly their flags. The Times, 22 December, 1989: 8.
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by Britain of the FIPZ rather than the anticipated reduction in its size. 109
Argentine ships and planes enjoyed, therefore, a substantial increase in
their freedom of navigation. Merchant ships were able to sail through the
former protection zone without prior British permission, while Argentine
fisheries patrol launches and aircrafts were free to operate within the FICZ
for the purpose of monitoring foreign fishing vessel operations. 11o
Notwithstanding that the 150-mile FICZ and the system of licences
remained in force, the future of the squid stocks was not very promising. 111
Demands for an extension of the FICZ to 200 nautical miles from the Islands
were still urged by Falkland Islanders worried by the reduction in license
revenues caused by overfishing. The increasingly favorable environment for
negotiations between Argentina and Britain resulted in a joint declaration for
the purpose of stock conservation and management. On 28 November,
1990, both countries agreed to declare joint control and supervision and to
impose a complete temporary ban to fishing by vessels of any Hag. This
jointly agreed zone, the Falklands Outer Conservation Zone (FOCZ, Fig.
2(f)), extending over 200,000 square kilometers in a semicircle north, east
and south of the FICZ, was enforced by British surveillance crafts beginning
on 26 December, 1990, and still in force at the time of writing.112 Provisions
109McEwen, A. 1990. Britain agrees to scrap Falklands protection zone. The Times, 16
February, 1990: 8.; and also see footnote 93.
110Falklands concession. The Times, 19 February, 1990: 9. In practice, restrictions of 15 and
70 nautical miles still apply for Argentine military vessels and planes, respectively,
approaching the Islands.
111 Falklands sounds stocks warning. Rshing News International, 29 (5): 3 [1990]; Falklands
squid crisis meeting Rshing News International, 29 (8): 2 [1990].
112Declaraci6n Conjunta sobre Conservaci6n de Recursos Pesqueros entre el Gobierno de
la RepUblica Argentina y el Gobierno del Reino Unido de Gran Bretal'la e Irlanda del Norte,
Buenos Aires and London, 28 November, 1990, Art. 1-6 and Annex.
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for Argentine patrolling of the FOCZ still need to be arranged. Another
salient point of this declaration is the establishment of the South Atlantic
Fisheries Commission, composed of officials from both states, for the
purpose of exchanging information, monitoring the implementation of the
fishing prohibition, and making recommendations to both governments on
conservation measures for fish stocks in the area.
Conclusion: The future of fisheries management in the region
The first decade after the Falklands War has witnessed four basic
arrangements, in terms of fishing operations, surveillance/enforcement,
access, and management measures, in the Patagonian shelf: 1) Exclusively
Argentine waters, 2) The British FICZ, 3) The Joint Argentine/British FOCZ,
and 4) The adjacent high seas areas. The continuing conflict among these
areas imposes severe constraints on possible agreement over conservation
and management policies. Alternatively, the wide distribution of stocks and
fleets determines that action applied in any of these areas will ultimately
echo in all of the others.
In 1989, Argentina ranked 33th in world fish catch. 113 However, the
Argentine fishing effort in territorial waters is considered to be below
optimum levels. For instance, the percentage of vessel utilization in the
small-scale fleet in 1987 reached just over 40%, about 60% of the trawler
fleet has a high average age, and the refrigeration plants in the fishing ports
usually operate at 50% of installed capacity.114 According to some
113World catch. Fishing News International, 31 (1): 10-11 [1992].
114Parin, M.A., S.N. Musmeci, and A. Zugarramurdi. 1990. The pelagic fishery of Argentina.
Infofish International, (6): 24-25; Bertolotti et al., supra footnote 70.
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estimates, the captures of coastal and offshore demersal species -aside from
hake, shrimp, croaker and pescadilla- could be doubled. 115 This situation
originates from internal economic and administrative instabilities,
international price crises, saturation of certain markets, protectionist policies
by importing countries and disadvantageous competition. To top it all,
Argentina's legislation with regard to jurisdictional claims and fisheries has
been multiple, unclear, and even contradictory.
At present, several legal instruments are being developed, and
obsolete legislation being revised and updated. For instance, the recent Law
23968116 eliminates tile confusion regarding Argentina's claims over its
maritime spaces and their boundaries by adopting the more familiar norms
embodied in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. As for fishing
legislation, Decree 2236 of 24 October, 1991,117 regulates the granting of
domestic fishing permits and establishes basic principles for the exploitation
of the resources. In the meantime, several bills are being debated in the
Argentine Congress for the sanction of a, very much awaited, national
fishing law.118 The greater political and economic stability emerging in
Argentina has opened new hopes for a revitalization of the fishing sector. 119
Fishing within the FICZ's boundaries is entirely regulated through
licenses issued by the Falkland Islands government. One of the objectives
envisioned by that administration upon creation of the FICZ, was .....to enable
115Supra footnote 70.
11 6See footnote 69.
117Boletfn Oficia/, October 30, 1991.
118Argentina needs new fishing law. Fishing News International, 29 (8): 35 [1990].
119Argentina: start of a new era. Fishing News International, 31 (3): 30-33 [1991].
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the Falklands to enjoy greater benefits from the resource". This program has
been receiving an annual US$ 30 million in fee revenues for the Islands'
economy; a little over one third of this amount is spent on research and
enforcement every year.120 Without doubt, the license scheme reduced the
total fishing pressure applied to the fishery. This licensing approach,
however, shows two major weaknesses. The first one is concerned with the
license granting mechanism. Eligibility to a license application to operate
within the FICZ stipulates that interested vessels need to agree on voluntary
restraints to protect squid stocks. By entering this understanding, licensed
vessels "promise" not to fish on those stocks while outside the FICZ in an
attempt to reduce the total fishing effort and to achieve higher catch rates per
vessel. 121
In general, cooperation and compliance to the rules between the
fleets and the government have been high. However, the perception of the
relative advantages resulting from such accord is linked to the different
values weighed by individual boats. Hence, the terms of these agreements
have not always been accepted which, translated in uncontrolled fishing
outside the area, jeopardizes the entire structure of the management
plan.122
The second limitation of the licensing program is that the generated
revenues are only a small fraction of the potential value of the resource
being managed. From the point of view of the Falkland Islands government,
120FICZ Fisheries Report '87/88, supra footnote 94.
121 Fishing News International, 29 (8): 2 [1990], supra footnote 111.
122See, for example, Falklands ban on Taiwan. Rshing News International, 29 (12): 10
[1990].
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it appears that a more productive utilization of the fishery, in the longer term,
would be possible through the implementation of alternative managerial
strategies such as a foreign subsidies program or joint ventures. 123 Perhaps,
the term interim in the zone's label, incorporates a time factor, reflecting
either a dynamic evolution in the operating regulatory measures or the
temporary nature of the existence of the zone itself.
The concert of voices ignited by the creation of the FICZ raised
diametrically opposite positions. On one extreme, Falkland Islanders were
disturbed by the fact that the area's breadth of 150 miles, instead of the
possible 200 miles, was ineffective in providing for stock conservation and
that substantial unlicensed foreign fishing was taking place right outside the
FICZ. On the other end of the spectrum, several Argentine sectors were
disputing the legitimacy over any of these claims and assuring that unilateral
decisions taken inside the FICZ were seriously affecting the Argentine
fishing industry. Fortunately, more moderate minds in both parties found
room for negotiations between these two extremes, with the understanding
that some cooperation was better than none at all.
The joint creation of the FOCZ is a good example of the improved
politic?' relations between both countries. Although it is too early to evaluate
the impact of this moratorium on the strengthening of the fishery, the
expectations are optimistic according to the South Atlantic Fisheries
Commission which recommended the extension of the fishing ban in this
area until 26 December, 1992.124 But two questions, certainly need an
123See, for example, Tomlinson, J.W.C. and I. Vertinsky. 1975. International Joint ventures
in fishing and 200-mile economic zones. Journal of the Fisheries Research Board of
Canada, 32 (12): 2569-2579; Doulman, D.J. 1990. Fisheries joint ventures revisited: are
they the answer? Infofish International, (3): 12-16.
124SritishlArgentine joint press statement on fisheries. London, December 5, 1991.
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answer in the near future: (1) What will happen when the stocks rebuild and
the moratorium is lifted?; and (2) Will the Anglo-Argentine relations be
sufficiently strong, at that time, to allow for an agreement on a joint
exploitation of the area? So far, the recent establishment of the FOCZ is an
indicator of confidence build up and opens a whole new dimension to
develop a variety of management strategies. The success or failure of this
joint declaration will depend on the diplomatic abilities and priorities of both
parties.
The proximity of high seas to either one of the previous three areas
remains the source of more complicated difficulties. Two problems, usually
linked together, are of immediate concern: the first one is represented by the
presence of foreign fleets outside 200 miles, actively poaching landward of
this limit. The second point of concern is that of an international fishing fleet
continuing to harvest straddling stocks during their residence in the high
seas. Far from being a relief, it should be mentioned that the Falklands case
is not unique in dealing with these two issues. Other locations around the
world have been facing the same circumstances without significant solutions
yet evident. 125 The multiplicity of interests operating in the high seas has
exposed limitations of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea on
straddling stocks126 as it specifies no distribution of competence, does not
define the extent of actions that a coastal state can take, and provides no
enforcement measures. This highest forum of international negotiation has
125Miles, E.L. and W.T. Burke. 1989. Pressures on the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 1982 arising from new fisheries conflicts: The problem of straddling
stocks. Ocean Development and International Law, 20: 343-357; Oda, S. 1983. Fisheries
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The American Journal of
International Law, 77: 739-755.
1261982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 63, Art. 116. International Legal
Materials, 21: 1261-1354.
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failed, so far, to resolve this recurrent controversy: the resistance of distant
water foreign fleets to accept regulations and control and, the anger and
frustration of coastal states witnessing a severe depletion of their offshore
stocks.
In a chronological sense, the conclusion of UNCLOS III and the end
of the Falklands war are events of almost the same age. Since then, the
management of the issue on foreign fishing offshore Patagonia and the
Falklands progressed more rapidly due to the individual or combined action
of Argentina and Britain, than from the simple application of pertinent
provisions included in the Law of the Sea. The complexity of technical
factors resulting from the nature of the resources, the way they are exploited
and the diversity of national interests, severely curtails the development of
an acceptable -and compulsory- multinational solution to the presence of
foreign fleets fishing on common stocks outside the 200 mile limit.127 While a
global solution to this aspect of foreign fishing seems to be, at best, several
years away, the immediate future of the fisheries offshore Patagonia
appears to be strongly dependent on the mutual understanding and allied
cooperation of Argentina and Britain. If the fishing policies in Argentina's
EEZ, the British FICZ, and the Joint Argentine/British FOCZ are consistent
with one another, at least with respect to the issue of distant water fleets, the
impact of foreign activities as affecting the Patagonian fisheries will be
significantly reduced. More importantly, however, is that successful
collaboration between both nations in the fisheries realm might breed a
favorable attitude to consolidate further joint agreements. Areas of mutual
agreement might include the exploitation of potential mineral deposits and,
127Kasahara, I. 1970. International fishery disputes. In: World Fisheries Policy (B.J.
Rothschild), ed.) The University of Washington Press, Chapter 2, pp. 14-34.
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perhaps, the solution to the even more delicate, and still pending, question
of sovereignty over the Islands. If lessons from the past are kept in mind, new
directions in the management of these fisheries seem possible.
40

Figure 2 . Succession of Argentine and British delimitation of the Patagonian shelf region.
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Figure legends
Fig. 1. The Falkland Islands Archipelago. From: Beck, P.J. 1988.
Fig. 2. A. The Patagonian shelf region: Argentine coastline, Falkland Island
and politico-economic sectors.
B. MEZ: Maritime Exclusion Zone (Britain), 7 April, 1982.
MDZ: Maritime Defense Zone (Argentina), 7 April, 1982.
TEZ: Total Exclusion Zone (Britain), 28 April, 1982.
C. EZ: Exclusionary Zone (Argentina), 29 April, 1982.
Extended Zone (Britain), 8 May, 1982.
D. FIPZ: Falkland Islands Protection Zone (Britain), 23 July, 1982.
E. FICZ: Falkland Islands Interim Conservation and Management
Zone (Britain), 29 October, 1986.
F. FOCZ: Falklands Outer Conservation Zone (Argentina/Britain),
28 November, 1990.
This figure has been entirely designed by Gustavo Bisbal based on the
information presented in the text.
43
Bibliography
ARTICLES
Aguilar, A.M. 1974. The patrimonial sea or economic zone concept. San
Diego Law Review, 2 (3): 579-602.
Ambito Financiero (Buenos Aires), Suplemento especial, 30 October, 1990:
1-4. Prefectura Naval Argentina.
Apple, Jr., R.W. 1982. Britain imposing a war zone around Falkland Islands;
Haig plans mediation trips. The New York Times, 8 April, 1982: A1,
A12.
Barston, R.P. and P.W. Birnie. 1983. The Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas
conflict. A question of zones. Marine Policy, 7 (1): 14-24.
Beck, P.J. 1985. The future of the Falkland Islands: a solution made in Hong
Kong? International Affairs, 61 (4): 643-660.
Bertolotti, M.I., G.V. Piergentili, and D.A. Cabut. 1985. EI sector pesquero
Argentino. Realidad Econ6mica (Buenos Aires), (65): 70-96.
Brandani, A. 1987. The coastal zone of Argentina: environments and
institutions. Coastal Management, 15: 43-59.
Churchill, RR 1988. The Falklands fishing zone. Legal aspects. Marine
Policy, 12 (4): 343-360.
Csirke, J. 1987. The Patagonian fishery resources and the offshore fisheries
in the South-West Atlantic. FAG Fish. Tech. Pap., (286): 75 p.
Diehl, J. 1982. Ships, planes called "hostile". The Washington Post, 30 April,
1982: A1, A22.
Doulman, D.J. 1990. Fisheries joint ventures revisited: are they the answer?
Infofish International, (3): 12-16.
Edwards, G. 1984. Europe and the Falkland Islands crisis. Journal of
Common Market Studies, 22 (4): 295-313.
Fishing News International, 29 (5): 3 [1990}. Falklands sounds stocks
warning.
Fishing News International, 29 (6): 14-15 [1990}. Southwest Atlantic Illex
squid. Fishing effort cannot be sustained.
Fishing News International, 29 (8): 2 [1990}. Falklands squid crisis meeting.
44
Fishing News International, 29 (8): 35 [1990]. Argentina needs new fishing
law.
Fishing News International, 29 (12): 10 [1990]. Falklands ban on Taiwan.
Fishing News International, 31 (1): 10-11 [1992]. World catch.
Fishing News International, 31 (3): 30-33 [1991]. Argentina: start of a new
era.
Garcia-Amador, F.V. 1974. The Latin American contribution to the
development of the Law of the Sea. The American Journal of
International Law, 68: 33-50
Giles, T. 1989. Argentina and UK fly their flags. The Times, 22 December,
1989: 8.
Gravelle, J.F. 1985. The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands: An international law
analysis of the dispute between Argentina and Great Britain. Military
Law Review, 107: 5-69.
Gulland, J.A. 1987. Falklands fishing. Marine Policy, 11 (3): 240.
Hu, N.-T.A. 1987. The Sino-Argentine "Squid war" of 1986. Marine Policy, 11
(2): 133-142.
Jacobson, D. and D. Weidner. 1989. Argentine-Soviet Fishery Relations
Reviewed, 1966-88. Marine Fisheries Review, 51 (2): 55-68.
Joyner, C.C. 1981. The exclusive economic zone and Antarctica. Virginia
Journal of International Law, 21 (4): 691-725.
Juda, L. 1979. UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order.
Ocean Development and International Law Journal, 7 (3-4): 221-255.
Juda, L.1991. World marine fish catch in the age of exclusive economic
zones and exclusive fishery zones. Ocean Development and
International Law, 22: 1-32.
Loayza, E.A. and L.M. Sprague. 1992. A strategy for fisheries development.
World Bank Discussion Papers, Fisheries Series, 135: 88p.
McEwen, A. 1990. Falkland Islands hope for a boom in minerals. The Times,
1 February, 1990: 7.
McEwen, A. 1990. Britain agrees to scrap Falklands protection zone. The
Times, 16 February, 1990: 8.
45
Miles, EL. 1988. Preparations for UNCLOS IV? Ocean Development and
International Law, 19: 421-430.
Miles, EL. and W.T. Burke. 1989. Pressures on the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 arising from new fisheries
conflicts: The problem of straddling stocks. Ocean Development and
International Law, 20: 343-357.
Nawaz, R. 1976. The emergence of exclusive economic zone: Implications
for a new Law of the Sea. Indian Journal of International Law, 16:
471.
Nelson, L.D.M. 1973. The patrimonial sea. International and Comparative
Law Quarterly, 22: 668-686.
Oda, S. 1983. Fisheries under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. The American Journal of International Law, 77: 739-755.
Parin, M.A., S.N. Musmeci, and A. Zugarramurdi. 1990. The pelagic fishery
of Argentina. Infofish International, (6): 24-25
Pereira Fernandez, F. 1985. Argentine fishery activity in light of the main
events which have recently affected it. In: Adjustments to changes in
fisheries law and economics (Cleveland, B.C., ed.) FAO Fish. Tech.
Pap., (269): 115p.
Petroleum Economist, 49 (5): 167 and 179 [1982]. Doubts over oil potential
of the Falkland Islands.
Redes de la Industria Pesquera Nacional, (46): 6-13 (1989]. Tiempo de
negociaci6n en el Atlantico Sur.
Selden, J. Mare Clausum sive De Dominio Maris. In: Lapidoth, R. 1975,
Freedom of navigation- its legal history and its normative basis.
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 6: 259.
Schumacher, E 1982. Argentina forms new zone in response to British
move. The New York Times, 8 April, 1982: A12.
Spafford, R.N. 1984. The Falkland Islands. World Fishing, 33 (10): 10-12.
The Times, 19 February, 1990: 9. Falklands concession.
Tomlinson, J.W.C. and I. Vertinsky. 1975. International Joint ventures in
fishing and 200-mile economic zones. Journal of the Fisheries
Research Board of Canada, 32 (12): 2569-2579.
46
Travieso, J.A. 1983. Hacia un horizonte de 200 millas. Notas sobre la zona
economica exclusiva en los espacios maritimos. Revista del Colegio
de Abogados de Buenos Aires, 43: 56 p
World Fishing, 35 (3): 3 (1986]. The Falklands - Action at last?
World Fishing, 35 (3): 43 [1986]. Action needed on squid.
World Fishing, 35 (8): 33 [1986]. EEC squid import control.
World Fishing, 35 (8): 33 [1986]. Falklands delay.
World Fishing, 35 (11): 3 [1986]. The Falklands - Action at last.
World Fishing, 35 (12): 3 [1986]. Common sense.
World Fishing, 35 (12): 23 [1986]. License fees for Falkland fisheries.
World Fishing, 37 (6): 56 [1988]. Falkland arrests.
World Fishing, 37 (12): 38 [1988]. Falkland Islands needs extended fishing
zone.
World Fishing, 38 (4): 26-28 [1989]. Spain maintains strong presence in the
Falklands.
BOOKS
Amador, F.V., 1972. Latin America and the Law of the Sea. Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Rhode Island, Occasional Paper No. 14: 52 pp.
Beck, P.J. 1988. The Falkland Islands as an International Problem.
Routledge, New York, 211 p.
Cushing, D.H. 1975. Marine Ecology and Fisheries. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, England: 278p.
Freedman, L. and V. Gamba-Stonehouse. 1991. Signals of War. The
Falklands Conflict of 1982. Princeton University Press, New Jersey,
476p.
Gamba, V. 1987. The Falklands/Malvinas War: model for North-south Crisis
Prevention. Allen & Unwin, Massachusetts, 212p.
Grotius, H. 1608. Mare Liberum (English translation by R.V.D. Magoffin,
1916).
47
Gulland, J.A. 1971. The Fish Resources of the Ocean. Fishing News (Books),
Surrey, England: 255p
Hastings, M. and S. Jenkins. 1983. The battle for the Falklands. W.W. Norton
& Co., New York, 384p.
International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1977. Vol. 10: 118-120
Kasahara, I. 1970. International fishery disputes. In: World Fisheries Policy
(B.J. Rothschild), ed.) The University of Washington Press, Chapter 2,
pp. 14-34.
Little, W. 1991. Political opinion in Britain. In: Toward Resolution? The
Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (W.S. Smith, ed.), Lynne Rienner
Publishers (London), pp. 63-80.
Maechling, Jr., C. 1991. Confidence building and the future. In: Toward
Resolution? The Falklands/Malvinas Dispute (W.S. Smith, ed.), Lynne
Rienner Publishers (London), pp. 109-119.
Middlebrook, M. 1985. Operation Corporate: the Falklands War, 1982.
Viking, 430p.
Morris, M.A. 1986. EEZ policy in South America's Southern cone. In: Ocean
Yearbook 6, (EM. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds.) The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 563-568.
Morris, M.A. 1988. South America Antarctic policies. In: Ocean Yearbook 7,
(EM. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds.) The University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, pp. 356-371.
Ocean Yearbook 3, (EM. Borgese and N. Ginsburg, eds.) The University of
Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 563-568, Appendix G.
Rubin, A. P. 1985. Historical and Legal Background of the
Falklands/Malvinas Dispute. In: The Falkliands War: lessons for
Strategy, Diplomacy, and International Law (A.A. Coli and A.C. Arend,
eds.), Chapter 2, pp. 9-21, Allen & Unwin, Massachusetts.
Strange, I.J. 1972. The Falkland Islands. David & Charles, Newton, Abbot,
256p.
Szekely, A. 1986. A study of the contribution of the Latin American states to
the development of the International Law of the Sea since 1945. In:
Latin America and the Development of the Law of the Sea. Part 1.
Oceana PUblications, New York, 361 p.
Von Glahn, G. 1986. Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public
International Law. MacMillan, New York, 763p.
48
DOCUMENTS
Boletfn Oficia/, March 17, 1944.
Boletfn Oficia/, December 5, 1946.
Boletfn Oficia/, 10 January, 1967.
Boletfn Oficia/, October 30, 1991.
Boletfn Oficia/, No. 27278, 5 December, 1991, Art. 1-11, Annexes I and II.
Brazil: Decree Law NO.1 098, 25 March, 1970.
British/Argentine joint press statement on fisheries. London, December 5,
1991.
Chile: Presidential Declaration, 23 June, 1947.
Compilaci6n Legislaci6n Pesquera. 1981. Secretarfa de Estado de
Intereses Marftimos, SUbsecretarfa de Pesca (Buenos Aires), NO.2:
120p.
Declaraci6n Conjunta sobre Conservaci6n de Recursos Pesqueros entre el
Gobierno de la Republica Argentina y el Gobierno del Reino Unido
de Gran Bretana e Irlanda del Norte, Buenos Aires and London, 28
November, 1990, Art. 1-6 and Annex.
Declaration of Latin American States on the Law of the Sea, Lima, Peru,
August 4-8, 1970.
Declaration of Santo Domingo, 7 June, 1972. American Journal of
International Law, 66: 918.
Diano Oficia/, 11 August, 1947. Supreme Decree 781, 1 August, 1947.
EI Salvador Constitution of 1950, Art. 7.
Falkland Islands Interim Conservation & Management Zone. Fisheries
Report '87/88. Falkland Islands Government (Stanley): 45p [1989].
First Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime
Resources of the South Pacific. Declaration on the Maritime Zone.
Santiago, Chile, August 11-19, 1952.
Gaceta Oficial, 24 December, 1946. Decree 449, 17 December,1946.
49
International Boundary Study. 1972. Bureau of Intelligence and Research.
Theoretical Areal Allocation of Seabed to Coastal States Based on
Certain U.N. Seabeds Committee Proposals, Limits in the Seas,
Series A, No. 46: 35p.
International Legal Materials, 29 (5): 1291-1295 [1990]. Argentina-United
Kingdom: Joint statement of relations and a formula on sovereignty
with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South
Sandwich Islands.
International Legal Materials, 29 (5): 1296-1304 [1990]. Argentina-UnHed
Kingdom: Joint statement on confidence-building measures, including
an information and consultation system and safety measures for air
and maritime navigation.
La Gaceta, 5 November, 1949. Decree-Law 803, 2 November, 1949.
Mexico: Presidential Declaration, 29 October, 1945. Laws and Regulations
of the Regime of the High Seas, 1: 13.
Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea, Montevideo, Uruguay, May
4-8,1970.
New directions in the Law of the Sea. Documents- Volume I, 1973, (S. H.
Lay, R. Churchill, and M. Nordquist, eds.) Oceana Publications,
N.Y.:13-14. Law 17094, 29 December, 1966.
Nicaragua Constitution of 1950, Art. 5.
Nicaragua: Decree No. II of 5 April, 1965.
Panama: Act No. 31, 2 February, 1967.
Proclamation No. 2667, "Policy of the United States With Respect to the
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental
Shelf", September 28, 1945. American Journal of International Law,
40: 45 [1946].
Proclamation No. 2668, "Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal
Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas", September 28, 1945.
American Journal of International Law, 40: 46 [1946].
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 63, Art. 116.
International Legal Materials, 21: 1261-1354 [1982].
United Nations, General Assembly, A/411784, s/18438, 31 October, 1986.
Carta de fecha 30 de octubre de 1986 al Secretario General por el
Representante Permanente de la Argentina ante las Naciones
Unidas.
50
United Nations, Laws and Regulations on the High Seas, pp. 4-5. Decree
No. 14708 concerning National Sovereignty over Epicontinental Sea
and the Argentine Continental Shelf, 11 October 1946.
U. S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Limits in the
Seas, No. 64: 16p [1975]. Continental Shelf Boundary: Argentina-
Uruguay.
51
